What do corruption, terrorism and smuggling have in common along the Tunisian-Libyan border?
In the first place, we can admit that the subject remains extremely topical due in particular to the fragile political-security stability that prevails in our Libyan neighbors[1] and to the extent that the damage caused by smuggling and by the parallel economy which has recorded a phenomenal jump from 02 to 15 billion in just ten years (from 2010 to 2020) and this, according to Ahmed El Karam, former president of the Tunisian Professional Association of Banks and Financial Institutions (Aptbef) to thus approach 40% of our GNP[2]. We can see, with great regret, that effective solutions to this problem are slow to come, but we are forced to observe that this state of affairs could not have been created without the benevolent complicity of “administrative officials”.
Corrupt people who made it easier for smugglers to do so, in exchange for bribes. More seriously, this illicit trade is benefiting terrorists through a phenomenon of communicating vessels, as highlighted in the excellent report produced in 2013 and which unfortunately remains relevant on the subject, by the International Crisis Group entitled: “Tunisia of borders: jihad and smuggling”, where we can read this shocking sentence describing the situation:
“As long as the permeability of the Tunisian borders is not reduced, smuggling will develop the jihadists’ nuisance capabilities while increasing the corruption of certain control agents… ». [3]
How did we arrive at this situation, weakening both our economy and our security? What are the emergency measures that can reduce the impact of this scourge on both the national economy and our security?
To answer these questions, it is necessary to return to the context and geostrategic conjuncture that accompanied or succeeded the “Arab Spring”, particularly with regard to Tunisia and Libya. This brings us back to the “Tunisian Revolution” which, it must be recalled, was an act of uprising of a freedom-loving people against corrupt leaders.
These are the same causes that were at the origin of the uprisings in Libya. However, the question before us today is the security implications of the “Arab Spring”.
What is the assessment and prospects for this fight against terrorism that the countries of this spring are facing?
Such questions are necessary in the light of this bitter observation of destabilization and security and political vulnerability of the countries of the region, either for Tunisia or Libya but also for Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Mali and Egypt. Although historically the birth of the terrorist phenomenon precedes the “Arab Spring”,it would be foolish not to acknowledge that its proliferation in the region has been made possible by the civil war that has ravaged Libya for almost a decade as well as by the collapse of state structures.
In addition, the fact that Libya faces five other sub-Saharan countries makes the context even more dangerous. To this observation, it is necessary to mention the weakening of the structures of the Tunisian State, in particular of its security apparatus during the years 2011, 2012 and 2013.
The tribe: A solid sociological foundation This rise in terrorism has been accompanied by the increase of another phenomenon, perhaps less dangerous in appearance: smuggling and the Tunisian-Libyan cross-border trade.
This is the emergence of an important informal activity that has always attracted the attention of the Public Authorities because of its very close links with terrorism. Observers and analysts of all stripes very quickly drew a parallel between these two phenomena.
Let us recall that smuggling has existed for a very long time and especially since the demarcation of borders by colonial forces, disrupting in this way good-neighbourly relations and trade between the tribes that live on these territories. These regions have long lived in the marginalization and exclusion of development models elaborated in the spheres of the central state, either in Tunis or Tripoli; the central powers have always ignored them, the the so inciting the populations to look for other ways to support themselves.
It should also be noted that this cross-border trade is based on a solid sociological base that is the tribe and that often the same tribe, settled on both sides of the border, engages in this activity based on relationships of trust that only blood ties can ensure and perpetuate.
These weapons that made the fortune of some smugglers We can note that before the fall of Ben Ali and Gaddafi, the intelligence services of both countries had taken the measure of this problem which was curbed in order to prevent it from taking too much scope, particularly in the trafficking of arms or drugs.
Some observers even argue that an agreement had been reached on both sides of the border between the authorities and the tribes in order to delimit the extent and nature of this cross-border traffic. However, it is clear that this pact was abandoned with the fall of the two Tunisian and Libyan regimes.
Since then, smugglers who were once limited to trafficking in fuel, tobacco, food or livestock have engaged in a more lucrative trade with weapons that could be estimated at fifty million pieces abandoned by the Gaddafi regime. These weapons have made the fortune of some small smugglers or criminals Tunisian, Algerian, Egyptian, Chadian or others; above all, they have equipped terrorist jihadist groups from all these countries.
This trafficking was facilitated by the links that were forged between the two sides and some smugglers converted to the terrorist cause with the help of widespread corruption of the few members of the security and Customs agents. Thus, considerable quantities of armaments were able to transit from Libya to Tunisia: weapons were well hidden in caches in the heart of Tunis and which would later be used for terrorist operations such as the liquidation of political activists such as lawyer Chokri Belaid and MP Mohamed Brahmi[4] or during operations, infamous: the attack on the Bardo museum and that of the Imperial Hotel in Sousse[5]… Structured and hierarchical informal trade But it should also be pointed out, although arms trafficking during the first months after the fall of the Libyan regime was the main source of financing for terrorist groups, that smuggling and cross-border trade very quickly became their main source of funding.
Informal trade was then structured and prioritized, with barons, wholesalers and retailers. This illicit trade is now a well-organized practice, obeying norms and standards, payments being made in the long term based on the relationships of trust stemming from the old tribal ties. The barons also specialized in specific sectors such as textiles or household appliances. They have divided the market so that some do not encroach on each other’s sectors and activities. This informal economy very quickly invested in virtually all sectors and structured economic activities, putting a heavy burden on state revenues due to the resulting tax shortfall. In the border area of Ras Jedir, the 60 wholesalers who monopolize the smuggling market alone have a capital of around 18 million dinars
. The daily exchange volume oscillates between 1 and 3 million dinars with a daily quotation of the currency and a daily exchange rate fixed the day before. All these elements mean that the annual amount of commercial transactions in the Ras Jedi area is estimated at 1,100 million dinars. Thus, the total turnover of the smuggling trade is estimated at 6.5 billion, or 15 to 20% of the flows of goods transiting through the regulatory circuit. It is, in fact, a phenomenon of development of the smuggling trade infiltrated by organized crime and terrorism; the proliferation of these groups under the impetus of new barons who do not recognize the state’s sovereignty or legitimacy is accompanied by a considerable reduction in options and alternatives that can curb this phenomenon.
A coordination that is lacking Today, Tunisia is facing a most complex situation: the hermetic vice erected along the border route to fight against any form of organized crime is clearly insufficient because of the connections between the leaders of terrorist groups and the sponsors of informal trade.
The State is therefore beginning a merciless struggle against this entire informal economy characterized by the existence of a great complicity between smuggling, corruption and terrorism. This terrorism, although residual, is likely, because of the proliferation of corruption, to regain ground very quickly thanks to the new ramifications of smugglers who will no longer be limited to border regions. The national effort to deal with this critical situation requires state action on several fronts: if the security aspect of the intervention requires special attention, it is above all at the legislative and institutional levels that it must be concentrated. State institutions must be well equipped and equipped to eradicate all forms of financial crime resulting from the proliferation of terrorism, smuggling and corruption. They must have solid and effective legislation that will be unanimously accepted by the various economic operators. The aim is to develop a legislative arsenal involving all parties concerned by providing for severe dissuasive penalties.
As a result, greater coordination must be implemented between national and international actions in this field in order to understand this phenomenon in its various aspects: social, economic, political, security… to find a better answer to this scourge. In this regard, we have established at the National Authority for the Fight against Corruption (INLUCC) since 2016, a center for studies, research and information on corruption that will be of great help in the fight to be carried out[6] in partnership with the various concerned, particularly in the academic, security, economic and other environments…
Strategies to combat these phenomena with action plans, particularly sectoral ones, must be quickly developed towards sensitive bodies such as customs, the national guard, the police, as well as the services of the ministries of transport and trade…
The judiciary is intended to keep pace with reforms and point-kick operations aimed at limiting this phenomenon. Ultimately, and above all, we must put an end to this situation of marginalisation and exclusion of these regions infested by this evil.
A situation that has lasted too long and has ultimately benefited only mafia groups and terrorists. This is another issue that will need to be addressed if we are to succeed in building a better future for our country and future generations.
* Chawki TABIB is a lawyer, former president of the National Anti-Corruption Authority.
Article by Chawki TABIB Translated by Rifi-JDD
