What the video shows

For more than three minutes, an unidentified man singles out Hamma Hammami by name, along with lawyers Samir Dilou, Mohamed Abbou and Ezzeddine Hazgui, and Rached Ghannouchi, the historic leader of the Ennahdha party. His tone leaves little room for ambiguity: the man repeatedly calls for Hamma Hammami’s execution, states he is personally prepared to carry it out, and describes a scenario in which those named would be rounded up and bound together. He also calls on the authorities to prevent some of them from leaving the country.

To justify his remarks, the man attributes to Hamma Hammami statements about a planned mobilization starting on July 25 — a date associated with the political process launched by President Kais Saied since 2021. That attribution could not be independently verified. Several Tunisian outlets, including Business News, chose not to broadcast the full video, limiting themselves to reporting its content for informational purposes.

A complaint, and a call from Paris

Given the severity of the remarks, Hamma Hammami announced he had filed a complaint with Tunisian authorities. His move quickly resonated beyond the country’s borders: Jean-Luc Mélenchon, founder of France’s La France Insoumise party, publicly voiced concern, describing Hamma Hammami as a comrade and a longtime advocate for democratic freedoms. He called for his security to be guaranteed and for those responsible for the threats to be punished, while stressing that such violence seemed foreign to what he described as his image of Tunisia, a country he called a friend.

The appeal was echoed by several supporters of the Workers’ Party, who are calling on the public prosecutor’s office to take up the case without delay, both to ensure effective protection for Hamma Hammami and to identify the video’s author. As of now, neither the prosecutor’s office nor the Interior Ministry has publicly commented on the state of the investigation or on any protective measures taken on the party leader’s behalf.

A climate of tension that extends beyond one man

What this affair reveals, above all, is the persistence of a climate of threats targeting political opponents, lawyers, human rights defenders and journalists in Tunisia. For several years, voices critical of the government have regularly reported online harassment campaigns, without their authors always being identified or prosecuted with the same rigor applied to other forms of expression. Opinion pieces devoid of any call to violence have, in the past, led to legal proceedings, feeding a sense among several human rights organizations that online content is treated unevenly depending on whether it supports or criticizes those in power.

A figure shaped by decades of repression

This is not Hamma Hammami’s first confrontation with the authorities. A former underground spokesman for the Tunisian Communist Workers’ Party under the rule of Ben Ali, he was arrested and imprisoned on several occasions and, according to accounts documented at the time, reportedly subjected to mistreatment in detention. After becoming secretary general of the Workers’ Party following the 2011 revolution, he established himself as one of the most consistent voices of the Tunisian left, including in his criticism of the new institutional framework put in place by Kais Saied since 2021.

Nor is this the first time Hamma Hammami has faced threats: similar episodes in the past earned him close protective security, which has since been scaled back. This latest warning thus comes against the backdrop of a Tunisian political climate still marked by sharp tensions between supporters and opponents of the process under way since 2021, one in which the question of freedom of expression continues to divide.

The investigation opened following Hamma Hammami’s complaint will now need to establish the identity of the video’s author. It remains to be seen whether the mobilization sparked by this affair, both within Tunisia and abroad, will help change how online threats against critical voices are handled by the country’s justice system.

The post Death Threats Against Hamma Hammami: Video Calling for His Execution Sparks Outrage appeared first on Jdd Tunisie.

Four Years of Proceedings, a Verdict Reaffirmed

The story begins in 2022. On June 13 of that year, amid a broader judicial mobilization, Anas Hmaidi was accused of deliberately disrupting a preliminary hearing at the Monastir court of first instance. The context matters: weeks earlier, 57 judges had been dismissed by presidential decree, triggering outrage within the judiciary.

For the case to proceed, Hmaidi’s judicial immunity first had to be lifted. That happened on September 20, 2022, by decision of the Provisional Judicial Authority. The investigation moved forward from there, eventually leading to trial on charges of obstructing freedom of work under Article 136 of the Penal Code.

The first-instance verdict came on April 6, 2026: the sixth correctional chamber of the Tunis court of first instance sentenced Hmaidi to one year in prison. He appealed — but never appeared at the subsequent hearings, despite two postponements granted to his lawyers. By then, the judicial source noted, he had already left Tunisian territory.

A Defense That Fought to the End

His legal team did not hold back. Before the first-instance court, they had requested a trial postponement pending the outcome of an appeal against the lifting of Hmaidi’s immunity, as well as consideration of a Court of Cassation ruling on a request to relocate the case. Both requests were denied.

His lawyers also pointed to what they described as procedural flaws, particularly regarding fair trial guarantees and the union rights meant to protect magistrates organized within a professional association.

The Association of Tunisian Magistrates has consistently maintained that the proceedings were flawed from the start. The organization points to the case’s transfer between multiple courts, an investigation it says was rushed, and the fact that its president was never questioned before being referred to trial. More broadly, the AMT views the case as a form of retaliation against Hmaidi’s union activism and his advocacy for judicial independence — and has called from the outset for the charges to be dropped.

A Trial Rooted in a Deeper Crisis

To understand this case, one must go back to the rupture of 2022. The dismissal of 57 judges that year, officially justified as an anti-corruption measure, was widely seen within the judiciary as a heavy-handed move lacking sufficient safeguards. The response came swiftly: strikes, sit-ins, sustained mobilization led in large part by the AMT, an association founded in 2016 to defend judicial independence from political power.

This episode fits into a broader institutional realignment underway in Tunisia since 2021, which several human rights organizations describe as a gradual erosion of the separation of powers. Against this backdrop, legal proceedings targeting union, political, and media figures critical of the government have multiplied, fueling concerns over pluralism and judicial independence in the country.

The Court of Appeal’s ruling does not close off the legal avenues still available under the law. Whether Anas Hmaidi, now outside Tunisia, will pursue them remains an open question — as does what this ruling will ultimately mean for the standoff that has pitted part of Tunisia’s judiciary against the executive for the past four years.

The post Anas Hmaidi Sentenced: Tunisian Appeals Court Confirms One-Year Prison Term appeared first on Jdd Tunisie.

The Facts: Two Cases, One Cumulative Sentence

The court ruled simultaneously on two separate cases, both stemming from Bensedrine’s tenure at the helm of the TDC.

The first case centers on an arbitration settlement agreement concluded with businessman Slim Chiboub, former son-in-law of ousted president Ben Ali. The chamber found Bensedrine, former TDC member Khaled Krichi, and former State Property Minister Mabrouk Kourchid guilty of abuse of office to the detriment of public administration. Bensedrine and Krichi were each sentenced to five years in prison; Kourchid received six. Chiboub, charged as an accomplice, was handed a five-year sentence as well. The defendants were also ordered to jointly reimburse approximately 1.776 billion dinars.

The second case concerns the Franco-Tunisian Bank (Banque franco-tunisienne, BFT). Here, Bensedrine faced additional charges of forgery and use of forged documents, on top of the offenses shared with her co-defendants. She was sentenced to five years for the common charges and an additional fifteen years for the forgery counts alone — retained as the most serious offense under the principle of penalty absorption. A joint civil fine of approximately 16.9 million dinars was also imposed.

The arithmetic of these convictions — five years in the first case, twenty years in the second — brings Bensedrine’s total sentence to twenty-five years, to be served immediately.

A Trial Marred by Procedural Irregularities

Beyond the severity of the sentence, it is the fairness of the proceedings themselves that has drawn the sharpest criticism from national and international observers.

On June 18, 2026, during the first scheduled hearing, Bensedrine’s family members, journalists, and civil society representatives were physically barred from the courtroom. No official explanation was provided by the tribunal. This exclusion stands in direct contradiction to the guarantees of a fair trial enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights — ratified by Tunisia — which establishes the public nature of hearings as a fundamental right of the accused.

The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), in a statement released the day before the verdict, urged Tunisian authorities to drop all charges against Bensedrine, describing them as “fabricated accusations” directly linked to her legitimate work leading the TDC. Civil society organizations have further invoked Article 96 of the 2013 Organic Law on Transitional Justice, which explicitly prohibits judicial proceedings against TDC members on the basis of the content of its final report — a provision the court apparently chose to disregard.

Bensedrine’s pretrial detention had itself raised serious legal questions. Placed in Manouba prison in August 2024 following an arrest warrant issued by an investigative judge at the economic and financial judicial unit, she launched a hunger strike on January 14, 2025, before being released on February 19 by order of the Court of Appeal, though remaining subject to a travel ban.

The Political and Economic Backdrop

This verdict cannot be understood in isolation from the political trajectory Tunisia has followed since July 25, 2021, when President Kaïs Saïed suspended parliament, consolidated executive and judicial powers in his own hands, and pushed through a constitutional overhaul that fundamentally restructured the country’s institutional framework.

Economically, Tunisia is navigating a prolonged structural crisis: sluggish growth, a chronic budget deficit, persistent inflation, and drawn-out negotiations with the International Monetary Fund that have yet to yield a comprehensive agreement. Against this backdrop of social fragility, the use of judicial proceedings against opposition figures and civil society leaders is widely interpreted by observers as a tool of political neutralization rather than a genuine pursuit of accountability.

The numbers are stark. Since July 2021, Human Rights Watch has documented the detention of more than eighty individuals — politicians, lawyers, journalists, and activists. In April 2025, thirty-seven opposition figures and human rights defenders had already been sentenced to terms ranging from four to sixty-six years on state security charges.

The TDC: The Unfinished Legacy of a Revolution

Established in December 2013 in the wake of the 2011 revolution, the Truth and Dignity Commission stood as one of the most ambitious transitional justice experiments in the Arab world. Mandated to investigate human rights violations committed since 1955, it received more than 62,000 complaints and referred 205 cases to specialized chambers, enabling prosecutions against former security officials, ministers, and businessmen connected to previous regimes.

To convict the woman who led that institution is, in the eyes of her defenders, to retroactively criminalize the very work of memory and reparation she embodied. The stakes of this case extend well beyond the fate of a seventy-five-year-old activist who has survived the prisons of Bourguiba, Ben Ali, and now faces sentencing under Saïed. What is ultimately on trial is the durability of a legal and moral legacy that post-revolutionary Tunisia built with great difficulty — and that the present authorities appear intent on dismantling.

The post Sihem Bensedrine Sentenced to 25 Years: A Verdict That Puts Tunisia’s Rule of Law on Trial appeared first on Jdd Tunisie.

The Charges

According to a well-informed source, the charges brought against the four defendants include “exploitation of public office to obtain an unjustified benefit for oneself or others, causing harm to public administration, violation of applicable regulations, as well as fraud and use of fraudulent documents.” The charges fall squarely within the scope of criminal law governing corruption in the management of public assets.

The case originates from a complaint filed in December 2022 by an association dedicated to the protection of the archaeological and cultural heritage of Carthage. The association alleged the existence of corruption in the transfer of a land parcel in the Carthage area to a private individual at a price bearing no relation to the property’s real value, and without prior consultation with state property appraisers. Experts subsequently appointed by the court confirmed a significant gap between the price recorded in the sale deed and the actual market value of the property at the time of the transaction — a discrepancy that, according to the complaint, caused substantial financial damage to the municipality. A specialized security unit was tasked with enforcing the arrest warrants against the four defendants.

Two Cases, One Journalist

This is not the only legal battle Ziad El Hani is currently fighting. The journalist was previously convicted in a separate case under Article 86 of the Telecommunications Code, which criminalizes harm to others through public communication networks, after publishing an online post that referenced information related to a judicial case. He appealed the one-year prison sentence, and the Tunis Court of Appeal has scheduled a hearing for June 12, 2026.

Two distinct proceedings, two different legal frameworks — one rooted in the management of public property, the other in digital expression — are now running simultaneously against the same individual.

Context: Special Delegations and Article 86

The case against El Hani in the Carthage affair reflects a broader legal grey zone surrounding Tunisia’s special delegations — appointed bodies that replaced elected municipal councils following their dissolution after July 2021. Decisions made by these structures are increasingly being revisited through judicial channels, exposing their former members to retrospective legal liability, regardless of their professional background.

Article 86 of the Telecommunications Code, meanwhile, has been applied in a growing number of cases targeting journalists and online commentators in Tunisia. International press freedom organizations, including Reporters Without Borders (RSF) and the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), have repeatedly criticized the provision for its broad and loosely defined scope, calling for its revision or repeal.

With the June 12 appeals hearing in the first case just days away, and a new arrest warrant now added to the picture, the legal fate of Ziad El Hani remains suspended — pending judicial decisions that are still far from settled.

The post Zied El Heni: New Arrest Warrant Issued in Carthage Municipality Corruption Case appeared first on Jdd Tunisie.

A Night of Verdicts, Decades of Prison

Thirty-five defendants. Sentences ranging from ten years to life imprisonment. The court showed no leniency toward the central figures of this case. Mustapha Khedher, whose name had circulated in judicial circles for years, received the most crushing punishment of all: life imprisonment, to which ninety-six additional years were attached. A figure that defies comprehension, a symbol of the extreme gravity of the criminal charges brought against him.

Next came Ridha Barouni, Taher Boubahri, Kamel Aïfi and seven other defendants, also sentenced to life imprisonment combined with seventy-six additional years. Fathi Beldi received life plus fifty years. Abdelaziz Daghsni, life plus thirty-seven years. Kamel Bedoui, life plus thirty-two years. Samir Hannachi, life plus thirty years. Rached Ghannouchi himself sits within this same category — a life sentence compounded by thirty years of additional imprisonment.

The fixed-term sentences were scarcely more lenient. Kaïs Bacar was condemned to forty-eight years in prison. Belhassen Naccache to forty-six. Ali Larayedh, former prime minister and Ennahda’s historic second-in-command, to forty-two years. Ali Ferchichi to thirty-four. Other defendants received sentences of ten, twelve or eighteen years — punishments that, in any other context, would be considered severe, yet here appear almost modest against the backdrop of the full picture. Without exception, every convicted person was also placed under administrative surveillance for five additional years following the completion of their sentence.

The court found the defendants guilty of several terrorism-related offenses: forming and joining a terrorist organization, and placing skills and expertise at the disposal of such an organization — charges that Tunisia’s counter-terrorism legislation punishes without ambiguity.

2013: Where Everything Begins

To understand this verdict, one must travel back thirteen years. In 2013, Tunisia was living through a period of intense political turbulence. On February 6, Chokri Belaïd, a charismatic figure of the Tunisian left, was shot dead outside his home at dawn. Six months later, on July 25, Mohamed Brahmi, a parliamentarian and nationalist activist, fell in turn to an assassin’s bullets. Two murders, two traumas, and a single question that remained without a definitive answer for years: who ordered these killings?

It was this question that the legal defense committee for the families of Belaïd and Brahmi brought before the courts in 2022, pointing the finger at what they call Ennahda’s “secret apparatus” — a clandestine structure that allegedly operated outside all legality, infiltrating state services, gathering intelligence, and, according to the prosecution, planning violent actions. Rached Ghannouchi is presented not as a bystander, but as the direct supervisor of this apparatus.

Ennahda, for its part, has always issued a categorical denial. The party rejects the very existence of such an apparatus and has condemned the proceedings from the outset as a political instrumentalization of justice, designed to eliminate the opposition.

A Party, a Revolution, a Fall

The history of Ennahda is inseparable from that of contemporary Tunisia. Born in clandestinity under the repression of Bourguiba, then Ben Ali, the movement survived decades of persecution before triumphing at the ballot box in October 2011, just months after the regime’s collapse. It was a historic moment — the first Islamist party to win free elections in the Arab world. Ghannouchi returned from a long London exile carrying the reputation of a liberal theologian, an advocate for an Islam compatible with democracy.

But the exercise of power quickly exposed the tensions running beneath the country’s surface. The 2013 assassinations, the economic crises, and the accusations of institutional infiltration gradually eroded the confidence of large sections of Tunisian society in the movement. When Kaïs Saïed suspended parliament in July 2021 and consolidated his grip over every lever of the state, Ennahda found itself squarely in the crosshairs of systematic judicial repression.

Since his arrest in April 2023, Ghannouchi has faced trial after trial, conviction after conviction. His party’s offices were shut down. His successors imprisoned. The movement that was once the country’s dominant political force is today a decapitated structure, its senior leadership either behind bars or in exile.

The Question That Remains

On this evening of June 2, 2026, Tunisia has rendered its legal judgment. But the questions this verdict raises cannot be locked inside a courtroom. Between those who see in these convictions the legitimate culmination of a long search for truth on behalf of the families of Belaïd and Brahmi, and those who read in them the judicial execution of a political movement by a power without counterweight, the divide is deep — and it will remain so long after the courthouse doors have been shut.

The post Pure factual Tunisia: Anti-Terrorism Court Sentences Ghannouchi to Life Imprisonment in Ennahda Secret Apparatus Case appeared first on Jdd Tunisie.

On Thursday, May 21, 2026, the criminal chamber specializing in financial corruption cases handed down the sentence against Tabib, a former bar association president who once led the National Anti-Corruption Authority (INLUCC). He was found guilty of forging documents, possessing and using forged papers, and destroying records. A judicial source confirmed the ruling to the Tunis Afrique Presse (TAP) news agency.

Forged documents at the heart of the case

The case dates back to 2020, when Tunisia was mired in a deep political crisis. Tabib, then at the helm of INLUCC, submitted a file to the Assembly of the Representatives of the People alleging conflicts of interest against the then-head of government, Elyes Fakhfakh.

While the move appeared to be a routine institutional procedure, it triggered a cascade of legal consequences. The court ruled that several documents transmitted to Parliament had been falsified, thereby compromising the integrity of an official act from an independent oversight body.

Weeks after submitting the file, in August 2020, Fakhfakh dismissed Tabib from his post — a decision that sparked sharp controversy and fueled debates about the genuine autonomy of regulatory bodies vis-à-vis the executive branch.

A man with a unique institutional career

Tabib is no ordinary defendant. A respected lawyer and former president of the national bar association, he was appointed to lead INLUCC in the years following Tunisia’s 2011 revolution. His profile — at the intersection of law and civil society — made him a reference figure in the fight against corruption.

His conviction by the very court tasked with prosecuting financial corruption crimes presents a paradox that will not be lost on the Tunisian public.

He appeared at trial while at liberty, though an arrest warrant had been issued by an investigating judge from the economic and financial judicial division, following an inquiry based on a report from the Court of Auditors.

Anti-corruption fight: progress and contradictions

Since 2011, Tunisia has built an institutional and legislative arsenal meant to make transparency a national priority. INLUCC, created in the revolution’s aftermath, was designed to be its flagship institution. But the gap between ambition and on-the-ground realities has only widened.

Successive reports from Transparency International, as well as Tunisian civil society groups, have consistently pointed to persistent corrupt practices at various levels of the state and the economy. The fragility of oversight bodies, their exposure to political pressure, and a lack of resources have all been cited as barriers to an effective anti-corruption drive.

In this context, Tabib’s trial unfolds during a particularly intense judicial period. Since the political turning point of July 25, 2021, and the subsequent reconfiguration of power around the presidency, several cases involving former senior officials have accelerated noticeably — feeding an ongoing debate over the conditions for judicial independence in Tunisia.

Thursday’s ruling is not final. As a first-instance decision, it remains subject to appeal, leaving the door open for further legal developments. Yet beyond the procedure, a fundamental question now looms large: How does a democracy under construction ensure that its oversight institutions remain immune to the very abuses they are meant to combat?

Source: Tunis Afrique Presse (TAP), May 21, 2026

The post Tunis Court Sentences Ex-Anti-Corruption Chief Chawki Tabib to 10 Years in Prison appeared first on Jdd Tunisie.

Demands That Transcend Professional Grievances

On the surface, the Tunisian Order of Lawyers lists six grievances: judicial sector reform, improved working conditions, the restoration of the Supreme Council of Magistrates, modernization of court infrastructure, the sustainability of the lawyers’ pension fund, and an end to prosecutions targeting certain bar members. In reality, these demands point toward a more serious diagnosis: that of a judicial apparatus in disrepair, directed from the top by the state executive.

Boubaker Blathaout, the bar’s dean, articulated the underlying stakes during the first gathering: “We defend our right to freedom, we guarantee fair trials, and we demand that justice not be used as an instrument of political conflict.” This seemingly basic assertion carries outsized symbolic weight in the current Tunisian context. It signals that the legal profession has grown weary of functioning as a willing extra in a system where judicial robes too often conform to the wishes of those in power.

The lawyers’ placards conveyed the same message with cutting directness: “No to the dismissal of the bar’s demands. No to the denial of justice.” Other signs read: “No restriction of the right to defense,” and “Guarantees of fair trial must exist.” These are not the slogans of a professional association seeking mere salary increases. They are declarations about the nature of state power itself.

The Crux: A Supreme Council in Limbo Since 2022

The fixation on the Supreme Council of Magistrates is not coincidental. After President Kais Saied’s seizure of power in February 2022—which brought about the dissolution of this institution—lawyers expected a swift restoration of this constitutional safeguard. Yet four years later, the CSM remains quasi-nonexistent as a functioning body. This absence is not a matter of bureaucratic sluggishness; it reflects a deliberate intent to keep judges dependent on executive will.

Without this council, magistrates lack any meaningful protection against political pressure. Appointments, transfers, and dismissals now flow from administrative decisions made without institutional counterweight. Lawyers view this situation as symptomatic of a deeper pathology: the progressive instrumentalization of judicial power. Several attorneys have themselves faced criminal prosecutions for alleged financial corruption—charges they regard as retaliatory measures.

The question haunting the bar is uncomfortable but essential: In a state where the executive controls judicial outcomes, can there be justice? The international legal community has answered this question with mounting alarm. The International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International, and MEDEL (the Mechanism for Cooperation among the Maghreb and West) have all issued reports documenting what they describe as a “grave erosion” of judicial independence in Tunisia.

Government Silence as a Form of Response

When confronted with this mobilization, the government has chosen indifference. Leïla Jaffel, Minister of Justice since October 2021, has consistently refused substantive dialogue with the bar association. The ministry went so far as to announce, even before the strike began, that courts would operate normally—a gesture of pure defiance. No offer of compromise. No opening to negotiation. Only refusal to listen.

This posture reveals something consequential: the executive views the judicial branch as its exclusive prerogative. By ignoring the bar’s demands, it sends a message to judges who might still harbor doubts about their subordination: independence is not a right but a revocable privilege.

A Judicial System Corroded by Institutional Breakdown

The lawyers’ strike does not emerge from nowhere. It responds to manifest deterioration across the judicial sector. International reports converge on a shared diagnosis: Tunisia’s judicial independence is undergoing systematic erosion.

The magistrates themselves have sounded alarms. The Tunisian Association of Judges has noted that the 2025-2026 judicial year marks the third consecutive year without institutional guarantees of independence. Rule-of-law violations accumulate: opposition politicians tried via videoconference on charges of “conspiracy against state security,” prolonged detention without procedural safeguards, a judicial system patently segmented along political lines.

Parallel to these political machinations, material conditions have deteriorated. Court clerks are understaffed. Buildings decay. Case delays stretch indefinitely. For lawyers—already accustomed to navigating a system grown hostile to robust defense—this combination breeds exhaustion. After years of unanswered requests for dialogue, patience has curdled into resistance.

The Contours of a Political Impasse

This strike exposes a fundamental contradiction at the heart of post-2022 Tunisia. The country adopted a constitution in 2014 whose Article 102 explicitly enshrines judicial independence. But once a president decides to exercise power differently, that independence becomes an inconvenient obstacle to be circumscribed or eliminated.

Lawyers striking today are not fighting for salary increases or shorter hours. They are fighting for the professional capacity itself—which is to say, fighting for the fundamental right of every person to competent legal defense. When the state renders the practice of defense impossible, it dismantles the foundations of rule of law.

The government, for its part, appears to be betting on attrition. It calculates that lawyers, facing lost income from the strike, will eventually accept the status quo. But this calculation overlooks a crucial social reality: no large-scale professional mobilization remains confined to its original grievances for long. It becomes symbolic, a crystallization of broader collective frustration. In a Tunisia already fatigued by political instability, the lawyers’ movement may well become a warning sign for growing swaths of the population.

The Critical Weeks Ahead

The timeline is compressed. Regional strikes will be staged through June 8th, followed by the national gathering on June 18th. If the bar achieves the level of mobilization it anticipates, courts could genuinely grind to a halt. No democracy has ever endured for long without a functioning judicial apparatus, however imperfect.

Two scenarios remain possible. In the first, the government makes partial concessions: it opens dialogue, accepts some reforms, restores the Supreme Council. This would require the executive to acknowledge limits to its power. In the second scenario, the strike persists, tensions escalate, and collateral damage mounts—hesitant investors, eroded public confidence, international legitimacy questioned.

Between these paths, the government has not yet chosen. Perhaps it has not yet grasped that the choice is urgent.

A Democracy at a Crossroads

The mobilization of Tunisia’s lawyers raises a broader question: Can a regime long prosper by evacuating its institutions of meaning? The answer Tunisia provides in the coming weeks will reveal much about its capacity to construct a durable rule of law—or its capitulation before that task

The post Tunisia: Justice Under Siege in a Political Power Play appeared first on Jdd Tunisie.

By the end of the year, coffee lovers will be paying up to $7 for a regular cup as cafes nationwide struggle to absorb growing overhead costs warned David Parnham, president of the Café Owners and Baristas Association of Australia.

“What’s happening globally is there are shortages obviously from catastrophes that are happening in places like Brazil with frosts, and certain growing conditions in some of the coffee growing areas,” Mr Parnham said.

“The cost of shipping has become just ridiculous.”

Key points:

• Prepare to be paying up to $7 a cup by the end of the year
• Shipping costs and natural disasters in coffee regions are being blamed for the price increase
• Australians consume one billion cups of coffee annually, but cafe owners say an increase in price won’t change that

It’s nearly five times the container prices of two years ago due to global shortages of containers and ships to be able to take things around the world.

The pain will be felt from the cities to the outback, but Mr Parnham said the increase was well overdue, with the average $4 price for a standard latte, cappuccino and flat white remaining stable for years.

“The reality is it should be $6-7. It’s just that cafés are holding back on passing that pricing on per cup to the consumer,” he said.

But roaster Raoul Hauri said it hadn’t made a dent in sales, with more than 300 customers still coming through the doors for their daily fix. “No one really batted an eyelid,” he said. “We thought we would get more pushback, but I think at the moment people understand.

“It is overdue and unfortunately it can’t be sustained, and at some point the consumer has to bear that.”

Paving the way for Australian producers

While coffee drinkers will be feeling the pinch, Australian producers like Candy MacLaughlin from Skybury Roasters hopes the increasing cost of imports will pave the way for growth in the local industry, allowing it to compete in the market.

“[In the ] overall cost of business, we haven’t been able to drop our prices to be competitive, so we’ve really worked on that niche base,” Ms MacLaughlin said.

“All those things will help us to grow our coffee plantation once more.”

She said the industry could eventually emulate the gin industry, with boutique operations cropping up across the country.

“I think the demand for Australian coffee at the moment is an ever-changing landscape and more and more Aussies are starting to question where their food comes from, who is growing it”

“What you will get is all these kinds of niche coffee plantations who develop a very unique flavour profile and then market in funky packaging and appeal to certain markets,” she said.

“That’s where I see the next stage of the Australian coffee industry going.”

The post Ukraine is pushing for EU membership. But what are the real chances? appeared first on Jdd Tunisie.

Accusations based solely on prison testimony

The facts stem from information provided by an inmate incarcerated at the Messaadine civil prison (Governorate of Sousse). According to case files, this individual, who shared a cell with Mehdi Ben Gharbia and Sofiane Bohachem, told prison authorities that Ben Gharbia had reported to him: “Youssef Chahed contacted Henry Kissinger, the former US Secretary of State, to ask him for massive sums of money to push the popular base to demonstrate and protest against the current regime, and specifically against the President of the Republic, Kaïs Saïed.” The same witness also mentioned a role attributed to Ahmed Néjib Chebbi in implementing this plan on the ground, as well as an attempt to dissuade businessmen from using penal reconciliation, with the stated aim of “causing the elections to fail” and “harming the Tunisian state.”

Based solely on these statements, the specialized indictment chamber for terrorist cases at the Tunis Court of Appeal ordered the three defendants to be referred to the criminal chamber for trial on charges of “resolution accompanied by preparatory acts to commit assassination,” “formation of a terrorist pact,” “undermining the internal security of the state,” and “contact with agents of a foreign power,” in accordance with articles 1, 5, 13, 32, 34, 36, 37, and 40 of Organic Law No. 26 of 2015 on the fight against terrorism and the repression of money laundering.

Defense denounces the absurdity of a “posthumous plot”

Mehdi Ben Gharbia has firmly denied all the accusations. During the investigation, he stated that his relations with Youssef Chahed had never gone beyond “political camaraderie” within the “Tahya Tounes” party. He also pointed out that he himself had filed a request for penal reconciliation in September 2023, which, according to his defense, contradicts any accusation of attempting to dissuade other businessmen from using this procedure. Furthermore, he insisted on the material impossibility of organizing any “subversive project” from a cell of barely 35 square meters, shared by 17 inmates. For his part, Sofiane Bouhachem stated he had “received no information” and questioned the credibility of the witness, describing him as someone “suffering from psychological disorders with a history of informing.”

The lawyer for Mehdi Ben Gharbia, described the procedure as a “judicial farce.” He noted that his client never shared a cell with the inmate in question, and that the prison administration provided no name, recording, or precise date. “They’re telling us about a man who died in November 2023 conspiring after his death. It’s absurd, but it’s dangerous,” he hammered.

In contrast, the witness, whose identity has not been disclosed and who is designated in court documents by the initials “Kh. H.,” said he was ready to reiterate his accusations. He claimed to have suffered “moral pressure” from Mehdi Ben Gharbia to force him to retract his statement and requested to benefit from the status of “witness X” to protect his identity. He also mentioned the existence of a “written document in Ben Gharbia’s handwriting,” containing a plan with code names.

An uncomfortable question: How do you conspire with a dead man?

Beyond the factual contradictions, this case raises a question as simple as it is troubling: How could Youssef Chahed have sought Henry Kissinger’s help when the latter died on November 29, 2023, nearly a year before the prison administration collected the testimony? The timeline of the alleged events – supposedly taking place in 2024 – makes the accusation, to say the least, fragile. Defense lawyers wonder: Is this a clerical error, manipulation of the witness, or a deliberate attempt to instrumentalize the name of a deceased figure to fuel a “foreign conspiracy” rhetoric?

Tunisian context: A justice system under political pressure

This case unfolds in an increasingly tightened political climate. Since July 25, 2021, Tunisia has seen the dissolution of parliament, the adoption by referendum of a new Constitution strengthening presidential powers, and a reform of the judicial system decried by its detractors as a “purge.” The 2022 legislative elections were widely boycotted, and civil society regularly denounces the use of anti-terrorism legislation to repress political opponents. In this context, the so-called “Kissinger conspiracy case” appears to many as a test of the Tunisian judiciary’s ability to free itself from political pressures, or conversely, as a symptom of its instrumentalization.

By trying to prove a plot hatched with a man who died eleven months before the events, the Tunisian justice system risks undermining its own credibility. How, without laughing, can one explain that Youssef Chahed could have contacted Henry Kissinger in 2024? Is it a gross error by the witness, manipulation by the prison administration, or an indirect admission that tangible evidence is sorely lacking? One question remains, troubling Tunisian observers: How far can the repressive apparatus bend reality before it finally bursts into the open? The answer may come on May 26, 2026, at the next hearing. In the meantime, the shadow of Henry Kissinger, dead for over two years, hangs over a case that defies, to say the least, all logic.

The post Posthumous accusations and cell rumors: How a long-term prisoner mobilizes Kissinger from beyond the grave appeared first on Jdd Tunisie.

By the end of the year, coffee lovers will be paying up to $7 for a regular cup as cafes nationwide struggle to absorb growing overhead costs warned David Parnham, president of the Café Owners and Baristas Association of Australia.

“What’s happening globally is there are shortages obviously from catastrophes that are happening in places like Brazil with frosts, and certain growing conditions in some of the coffee growing areas,” Mr Parnham said.

“The cost of shipping has become just ridiculous.”

Key points:

• Prepare to be paying up to $7 a cup by the end of the year
• Shipping costs and natural disasters in coffee regions are being blamed for the price increase
• Australians consume one billion cups of coffee annually, but cafe owners say an increase in price won’t change that

It’s nearly five times the container prices of two years ago due to global shortages of containers and ships to be able to take things around the world.

The pain will be felt from the cities to the outback, but Mr Parnham said the increase was well overdue, with the average $4 price for a standard latte, cappuccino and flat white remaining stable for years.

“The reality is it should be $6-7. It’s just that cafés are holding back on passing that pricing on per cup to the consumer,” he said.

But roaster Raoul Hauri said it hadn’t made a dent in sales, with more than 300 customers still coming through the doors for their daily fix. “No one really batted an eyelid,” he said. “We thought we would get more pushback, but I think at the moment people understand.

“It is overdue and unfortunately it can’t be sustained, and at some point the consumer has to bear that.”

Paving the way for Australian producers

While coffee drinkers will be feeling the pinch, Australian producers like Candy MacLaughlin from Skybury Roasters hopes the increasing cost of imports will pave the way for growth in the local industry, allowing it to compete in the market.

“[In the ] overall cost of business, we haven’t been able to drop our prices to be competitive, so we’ve really worked on that niche base,” Ms MacLaughlin said.

“All those things will help us to grow our coffee plantation once more.”

She said the industry could eventually emulate the gin industry, with boutique operations cropping up across the country.

“I think the demand for Australian coffee at the moment is an ever-changing landscape and more and more Aussies are starting to question where their food comes from, who is growing it”

“What you will get is all these kinds of niche coffee plantations who develop a very unique flavour profile and then market in funky packaging and appeal to certain markets,” she said.

“That’s where I see the next stage of the Australian coffee industry going.”

The post Netflix to premiere African reality show ‘Young, Famous & African’ appeared first on Jdd Tunisie.