The President of the Republic, Kaïs Saïed, elected by about a quarter of the Tunisian people, announced the suspension of the work of the elected parliament, the dismissal of the head of government, Hichem Mechichi, and the granting of executive power and the prosecution.
The President of the Republic relied on Article 80 of the Constitution, which gives him the right to take exceptional measures in the event of “imminent danger” threatening the country, without specifying what threats it is.
To understand the decisions taken by the President of the Republic, Kaïs Saïed, we must return to the evolution of the situation since 2011. The historical context After the fall of the Ben Ali regime, three schools were opposed: the first, including are among the specialists in constitutional law, consisted in wanting to reform from within the legal and political system of Ben Ali; the second, defended by diplomat Rafâa Ben Achour and by Ennahdha, believed in a structural and institutional solution, consisting in ensuring the democratic transition through elections and therefore in resolving conflicts through the ballot box; as for the third, more radical, even revolutionary, it was oriented towards a council of revolutionary forces, through which a political plan would be announced which would include a reform of state institutions in the sectors of health, education, media, transport and economy, before any election.
It is this approach that failed in February 2011, before Béji Caïd Essebsi took the reins of the Prime Ministry after the overthrow of the government of Mohamed Ghannouchi. The October 2011 elections were a real concretization of the structural approach defended by all bourgeois forces, because they guaranteed the sustainability of the control of the smuggling and money lobbies.
Since winning the 2011 elections, the Ennahdna movement has become the main actor in the country’s political confrontation.
His first steps in power surprisingly corresponded to the start of a confrontation with the state. Power had to rule a country in crisis, in which society multiplies deep and violent sociological contradictions: Tunisian society is as conservative as it is open-minded, liberal to the point of secularism, a society that does not consider much. thing in prayer but sanctify fasting and celebrate Ramadan through alcoholic evenings …
Ennahda in Power Against the State The Ennahda movement has failed to find the words or measure the complexities of society, administration, and therefore the state. However, the party was able to benefit from the support of the international community after its electoral victory in October 2011, in a global context which had seen the victory of Mohammed Morsi in Egypt, that of the Islamists in Libya or the beginning of a feeling of Islamist expansion in many Arab countries with the war in Syria against the regime and the revolution in Yemen.
If he showed a certain political “arrogance”, which led him to mock his ex-opponents who had lost at the ballot box, the Ennahdha movement did not realize that it was facing State apparatuses formed in an authoritarian climate and that Islamization would only take place by violent means.
Tunisia experienced the assassination of leftist leader Chokri Belaïd in February 2013, followed by the assassination of nationalist activist Mohamed Brahmi five months later.
This plunged the country into a political chess game, which began with the resignation of the head of the Nahdhaoui government Ali Larayedh and the appointment of Mehdi Jomaa after a “national dialogue”. Elections were then held in 2014, which led to the victory of Nidaa Tounes, just ahead of the Ennahdha movement. This period was characterized by what has been called “the reign of the two sheikhs” namely Beji Caid Essebsi and Rached Ghannouchi, which ended with the death of “BCE” on July 25, 2019.
Early elections took place and led to a landslide victory for Kaïs Saïed over his rivals in the presidential elections. Then to the victory of the Ennahdha movement during the legislative elections. The movement was then supported by the al Karama coalition, the radical Islamist faction.
Trojan horse and possible scenarios Subsequently, the Ennahdha movement was forced to support Kaïs Saïed against Nabil Karoui, who built his electoral campaign on his hostility towards Ennahdha. Kais Saïed has long been regarded as Ennahdha’s Horse of Three, who was to serve the Islamist party to act behind the scenes in the palace of Carthage. Kaïs Saïed became president of the republic with the majority of votes. He always said during his election campaign that he had no program and that his only program was the people. “People want,” he liked to say, considering that the current political system was a dysfunctional and sick system. He denounced the electoral law which had enabled him to become president and direct management of regional affairs.
For several months, Kais Said shared executive power with Ennahda. Quickly, conflicts made relations between the president and the movement complicated. The game of chess resulted in the overthrow of Elyes Fakhfakh’s government by Ennahdha, who accused him of a conflict of interest. The president then chose former interior minister Hichem Mechichi to head the government. Carthage and the Kasba – backed by Parliament, controlled for the most part by Ennahdha and his allies – ended up opposing each other. The start of an intractable political crisis? What is the secret of Article 80? This political and historical context served as a general framework for the events which took place in the country on July 25, 2021. The President of the Republic resorted to article 80 of the Tunisian Constitution, which states: “In case of peril imminent threatening the institutions of the nation and the security and independence of the country and hampering the regular functioning of public powers, the President of the Republic may take the measures required by this exceptional situation, after consultation with the Head of Government and the President of the Assembly of People’s Representatives and after having informed the President of the Constitutional Court.
He announces the measures in a statement to the people ”. But how can the President of the Republic announce these measures in the absence of a Constitutional Court? And above all, what blocked the establishment of this jurisdiction? Amin Mahfoudh considers that it was Ennahdha who disrupted the establishment of the Constitutional Court, and that the Islamist movement must therefore bear its responsibility. Constitutional law professor Salim Laghmani believes that in the absence of a Constitutional Court, the President of the Republic is responsible for preserving the Constitution and therefore has the responsibility for its interpretation. Finally, Yadh Ben Achour assures us that the President of the Republic did not respect the terms of article 80, and therefore considers that it was a “coup d’etat”. But the debate on whether or not to coup is secondary. Because what matters is not the form, but the substance of Article 80, which clearly states that “these measures must aim to guarantee the return as soon as possible to a regular functioning of the public authorities”.
The Constitution stipulates that “the President of the Republic cannot dissolve the Assembly of People’s Representatives and no motion of censure against the government can be presented”.
By first claiming the presidency of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, Kaïs Saïed crossed the red line, according to the Association of Lawyers, which denounces the end of the principle of the separation of powers. The nature of the crisis in Tunisia Coup d’etat or not, the full powers that Kaïs Saïed granted himself were neither usurped nor imposed by the tanks. These are exceptional constitutional measures, which can be interpreted, and the President of the Republic has the power to interpret them in the absence of the Constitutional Court.
However, the framework set, it is a question of answering another question: is the main problem of Tunisia really a constitutional one?
• The poverty rate has exceeded 53% in some areas, such as Hassi Al-Farid, in the governorate of Kasserine in west-central Tunisia;
• The country has an illiteracy rate of up to 18%; • The percentage of foreign debt is less than 90% of gross domestic product, or about 100 billion dinars;
• The unemployment rate is around 17%; • The trade balance deficit is negative, as is the growth ratio; • Finally, nearly 20,000 Tunisians died from Covid-19 Too much inaction, time for action? The current political system is a failure. The political crisis that the country is going through has reached its climax. Did the president have any choice but to strike hard in an attempt to restore state and security?
Kaïs Saïed certainly made a constitutional scam, but he enjoyed great popular and civil support, but also state institutions. We have entered into a historic political process, which should allow the country to recover. But today there is a lack of guarantees, in particular demanded by the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), such as the need to set the deadline for this exceptional period and to announce the electoral agenda of what can be considered to be a transition. The Tunisian people cannot accept that transparent and democratic elections are the only possible outcome in this period. It is a whole process that will be scrutinized and analyzed. While some of the leaders of the Ennahdha movement have enriched themselves for several years, not respecting the raison d’être of the movement, Kaïs Saïed puts Ennahdha under pressure from their base. Evil for good for the movement, which could emerge more powerful by reorganizing itself around what made its strength: the idea of a group. It remains to be seen what the President of the Republic will announce: Tunisians expect radical reforms, be they social, security or judicial.
• The poverty rate has exceeded 53% in some areas, such as Hassi Al-Farid, in the governorate of Kasserine in west-central Tunisia;
• The country has an illiteracy rate of up to 18%; • The percentage of foreign debt is less than 90% of gross domestic product, or about 100 billion dinars;
• The unemployment rate is around 17%; • The trade balance deficit is negative, as is the growth ratio; • Finally, nearly 20,000 Tunisians have died from Covid-19 Too much inaction, time for action? The current political system is a failure. The political crisis that the country is going through has reached its climax. Did the president have any choice but to strike hard in an attempt to restore state and security?
Kaïs Saïed certainly made a constitutional scam, but he enjoyed great popular and civil support, but also state institutions. We have entered into a historic political process, which should allow the country to recover. But today there is a lack of guarantees, in particular demanded by the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), such as the need to set the deadline for this exceptional period and to announce the electoral agenda of what can be considered to be a transition. The Tunisian people cannot accept that transparent and democratic elections are the only possible outcome in this period. It is a whole process that will be scrutinized and analyzed.
While some of the leaders of the Ennahdha movement have enriched themselves for several years, not respecting the raison d’être of the movement, Kaïs Saïed puts Ennahdha under pressure from their base. Evil for good for the movement, which could emerge more powerful by reorganizing itself around what made its strength: the idea of a group. It remains to be seen what the President of the Republic will announce: Tunisians expect radical reforms, be they social, security or judicial.
History gave Tunisia in 2011 the opportunity to create an epistemic scene and to break away from authoritarian and submissive paradigms. However, the election of the Ennahdha movement in elections which, if transparent, were not fair, took place in a difficult context for the people.
In times of acute crisis, votes usually tend to go to the right of the political spectrum. But have the elections ever changed the course of history in Tunisia? The country needs a revolutionary, democratic national program that can offer solutions within the framework of the strategy of independence of national decision-making. We need a clear roadmap. Kaïs Saïed knows it: the Tunisian people have no other choice than to push them to rebuild a solid state, devoid of all tyranny and injustice.
The Tunisian people have the opportunity to show the world that a new human-based political approach is possible. But it is a real project that is imposed on Tunisia. On July 25, 2021, Tunisia took a new turn after that of January 14, 2011. The President of the Republic, Kaïs Saïed, elected by about a quarter of the Tunisian people, announced the suspension of the work of the elected parliament, the dismissal of the head of government, Hichem Mechichi, and the granting of executive power and prosecution.
The President of the Republic relied on Article 80 of the Constitution, which gives him the right to take exceptional measures in the event of “imminent danger” threatening the country, without specifying what threats it is. To understand the decisions taken by the President of the Republic, Kaïs Saïed, we must return to the evolution of the situation since 2011. The historical context After the fall of the Ben Ali regime, three schools were opposed: the first, including are among the specialists in constitutional law, consisted in wanting to reform from within the legal and political system of Ben Ali; the second, defended by diplomat Rafâa Ben Achour and by Ennahdha, believed in a structural and institutional solution, consisting in ensuring the democratic transition through elections and therefore in resolving conflicts through the ballot box; as for the third, more radical, even revolutionary, it was oriented towards a council of revolutionary forces, through which a political plan would be announced which would include a reform of state institutions in the sectors of health, education, media, transport and economy, before any election.
It is this approach that failed in February 2011, before Béji Caïd Essebsi took the reins of the Prime Ministry after the overthrow of the government of Mohamed Ghannouchi. The October 2011 elections were a real concretization of the structural approach defended by all bourgeois forces, because they guaranteed the sustainability of the control of the smuggling and money lobbies.
Since winning the 2011 elections, the Ennahdna movement has become the main actor in the country’s political confrontation. His first steps in power surprisingly corresponded to the start of a confrontation with the state. Power had to rule a country in crisis, in which society multiplies deep and violent sociological contradictions: Tunisian society is as conservative as it is open-minded, liberal to the point of secularism, a society that does not consider much. thing in prayer but sanctifies fasting and celebrates Ramadan through alcoholic evenings…
Ennahda in power against the State The Ennahda movement has not been able to find the words nor to take the measure of the complexities of society, of administration , and therefore of the State. However, the party was able to benefit from the support of the international community after its electoral victory in October 2011, in a global context which had seen the victory of Mohammed Morsi in Egypt, that of the Islamists in Libya or the beginning of a feeling of Islamist expansion in many Arab countries with the war in Syria against the regime and the revolution in Yemen.
If he showed a certain political “arrogance”, which led him to mock his ex-opponents who had lost at the ballot box, the Ennahdha movement did not realize that it was facing State apparatuses formed in an authoritarian climate and that Islamization would only take place by violent means.
Tunisia experienced the assassination of leftist leader Chokri Belaïd in February 2013, followed by the assassination of nationalist activist Mohamed Brahmi five months later. This plunged the country into a political chess game, which began with the resignation of the head of the Nahdhaoui government Ali Larayedh and the appointment of Mehdi Jomaa after a “national dialogue”. Elections were then held in 2014, which led to the victory of Nidaa Tounes, just ahead of the Ennahdha movement. This period was characterized by what has been called “the reign of the two sheikhs”, namely Beji Caid Essebsi and Rached Ghannouchi, which ended with the death of “BCE” on July 25, 2019. Early elections were held. took place and led to a landslide victory for Kaïs Saïed against his rivals in the presidential elections.
Then to the victory of the Ennahdha movement during the legislative elections. The movement was then supported by the al Karama coalition, the radical Islamist faction. Trojan horse and possible scenarios Subsequently, the Ennahdha movement was forced to support Kaïs Saïed against Nabil Karoui, who built his electoral campaign on his hostility towards Ennahdha. Kais Saïed has long been regarded as Ennahdha’s Horse of Three, who was to serve the Islamist party to act behind the scenes in the palace of Carthage. Kaïs Saïed became president of the republic with the majority of votes.
He always said during his election campaign that he had no program and that his only program was the people. “People want,” he liked to say, considering that the current political system was a dysfunctional and sick system. He denounced the electoral law which had enabled him to become president and direct management of regional affairs. For several months, Kais Said shared executive power with Ennahda. Quickly, conflicts made relations between the president and the movement complicated. The game of chess resulted in the overthrow of Elyes Fakhfakh’s government by Ennahdha, who accused him of a conflict of interest. The president then chose former interior minister Hichem Mechichi to head the government.
Carthage and the Kasba – backed by Parliament, controlled for the most part by Ennahdha and his allies – ended up opposing each other. The start of an intractable political crisis? What is the secret of Article 80? This political and historical context served as a general framework for the events that unfolded in the country on July 25, 2021.
The President of the Republic had recourse to article 80 of the Tunisian Constitution, which states: “In the event of imminent danger threatening the institutions of the nation and the security and independence of the country and hindering the regular functioning of public powers , the President of the Republic may take the measures required by this exceptional situation, after consulting the Head of Government and the President of the Assembly of People’s Representatives and after having informed the President of the Constitutional Court thereof. He announces the measures in a statement to the people ”.
But how can the President of the Republic announce these measures in the absence of a Constitutional Court? And above all, what blocked the establishment of this jurisdiction? Amin Mahfoudh considers that it was Ennahdha who disrupted the establishment of the Constitutional Court, and that the Islamist movement must therefore bear its responsibility. Constitutional law professor Salim Laghmani believes that in the absence of a Constitutional Court, the President of the Republic is responsible for preserving the Constitution and therefore has the responsibility for its interpretation. Finally, Yadh Ben Achour assures us that the President of the Republic did not respect the terms of article 80, and therefore considers that it was a “coup d’etat”. But the debate on whether or not to coup is secondary. Because what matters is not the form, but the substance of Article 80, which clearly states that “these measures must aim to guarantee the return as soon as possible to a regular functioning of the public authorities”.
The Constitution stipulates that “the President of the Republic cannot dissolve the Assembly of People’s Representatives and no motion of censure against the government can be presented”. By first claiming the presidency of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, Kaïs Saïed crossed the red line, according to the Association of Lawyers, which denounces the end of the principle of the separation of powers. The nature of the crisis in Tunisia Coup d’etat or not, the full powers that Kaïs Saïed granted himself were neither usurped nor imposed by the tanks. These are exceptional constitutional measures, which can be interpreted, and the President of the Republic has the power to interpret them in the absence of the Constitutional Court.
However, the framework set, it is a question of answering another question: is the main problem of Tunisia really a constitutional one?
• The poverty rate has exceeded 53% in some areas, such as Hassi Al-Farid, in the governorate of Kasserine in west-central Tunisia;
• The country has an illiteracy rate of up to 18%;
• The percentage of foreign debt is less than 90% of gross domestic product, or about 100 billion dinars;
• The unemployment rate is around 17%; • The trade balance deficit is negative, as is the growth ratio;
• Finally, nearly 20,000 Tunisians have died from Covid-19 Too much inaction, time for action? The current political system is a failure. The political crisis that the country is going through has reached its climax. Did the president have any choice but to strike hard in an attempt to restore state and security? Kaïs Saïed certainly made a constitutional scam, but he enjoyed great popular and civil support, but also state institutions. We have entered into a historic political process, which should allow the country to recover. But today there is a lack of guarantees, in particular demanded by the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), such as the need to set the deadline for this exceptional period and to announce the electoral agenda of what can be considered to be a transition. The Tunisian people cannot accept that transparent and democratic elections are the only possible outcome in this period. It is a whole process that will be scrutinized and analyzed.
While some of the leaders of the Ennahdha movement have enriched themselves for several years, not respecting the raison d’être of the movement, Kaïs Saïed puts Ennahdha under pressure from their base. Evil for good for the movement, which could emerge more powerful by reorganizing itself around what made its strength: the idea of a group. It remains to be seen what the President of the Republic will announce: Tunisians expect radical reforms, be they social, security or judicial. History gave Tunisia in 2011 the opportunity to create an epistemic scene and to break away from authoritarian and submissive paradigms. However, the election of the Ennahdha movement in elections which, if transparent, were not fair, took place in a difficult context for the people. In times of acute crisis, votes usually tend to go to the right of the political spectrum.
But have the elections ever changed the course of history in Tunisia? The country needs a revolutionary, democratic national program that can offer solutions within the framework of the strategy of independence of national decision-making. We need a clear roadmap.
Kaïs Saïed knows it: the Tunisian people have no other choice than to push them to rebuild a solid state, devoid of all tyranny and injustice. The Tunisian people have the opportunity to show the world that a new human-based political approach is possible. But it is a real project that is imposed on Tunisia.
By:Mongi Khadhraoui
Translated by Rifi-JDD
