The Facts: Two Cases, One Cumulative Sentence

The court ruled simultaneously on two separate cases, both stemming from Bensedrine’s tenure at the helm of the TDC.

The first case centers on an arbitration settlement agreement concluded with businessman Slim Chiboub, former son-in-law of ousted president Ben Ali. The chamber found Bensedrine, former TDC member Khaled Krichi, and former State Property Minister Mabrouk Kourchid guilty of abuse of office to the detriment of public administration. Bensedrine and Krichi were each sentenced to five years in prison; Kourchid received six. Chiboub, charged as an accomplice, was handed a five-year sentence as well. The defendants were also ordered to jointly reimburse approximately 1.776 billion dinars.

The second case concerns the Franco-Tunisian Bank (Banque franco-tunisienne, BFT). Here, Bensedrine faced additional charges of forgery and use of forged documents, on top of the offenses shared with her co-defendants. She was sentenced to five years for the common charges and an additional fifteen years for the forgery counts alone — retained as the most serious offense under the principle of penalty absorption. A joint civil fine of approximately 16.9 million dinars was also imposed.

The arithmetic of these convictions — five years in the first case, twenty years in the second — brings Bensedrine’s total sentence to twenty-five years, to be served immediately.

A Trial Marred by Procedural Irregularities

Beyond the severity of the sentence, it is the fairness of the proceedings themselves that has drawn the sharpest criticism from national and international observers.

On June 18, 2026, during the first scheduled hearing, Bensedrine’s family members, journalists, and civil society representatives were physically barred from the courtroom. No official explanation was provided by the tribunal. This exclusion stands in direct contradiction to the guarantees of a fair trial enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights — ratified by Tunisia — which establishes the public nature of hearings as a fundamental right of the accused.

The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), in a statement released the day before the verdict, urged Tunisian authorities to drop all charges against Bensedrine, describing them as “fabricated accusations” directly linked to her legitimate work leading the TDC. Civil society organizations have further invoked Article 96 of the 2013 Organic Law on Transitional Justice, which explicitly prohibits judicial proceedings against TDC members on the basis of the content of its final report — a provision the court apparently chose to disregard.

Bensedrine’s pretrial detention had itself raised serious legal questions. Placed in Manouba prison in August 2024 following an arrest warrant issued by an investigative judge at the economic and financial judicial unit, she launched a hunger strike on January 14, 2025, before being released on February 19 by order of the Court of Appeal, though remaining subject to a travel ban.

The Political and Economic Backdrop

This verdict cannot be understood in isolation from the political trajectory Tunisia has followed since July 25, 2021, when President Kaïs Saïed suspended parliament, consolidated executive and judicial powers in his own hands, and pushed through a constitutional overhaul that fundamentally restructured the country’s institutional framework.

Economically, Tunisia is navigating a prolonged structural crisis: sluggish growth, a chronic budget deficit, persistent inflation, and drawn-out negotiations with the International Monetary Fund that have yet to yield a comprehensive agreement. Against this backdrop of social fragility, the use of judicial proceedings against opposition figures and civil society leaders is widely interpreted by observers as a tool of political neutralization rather than a genuine pursuit of accountability.

The numbers are stark. Since July 2021, Human Rights Watch has documented the detention of more than eighty individuals — politicians, lawyers, journalists, and activists. In April 2025, thirty-seven opposition figures and human rights defenders had already been sentenced to terms ranging from four to sixty-six years on state security charges.

The TDC: The Unfinished Legacy of a Revolution

Established in December 2013 in the wake of the 2011 revolution, the Truth and Dignity Commission stood as one of the most ambitious transitional justice experiments in the Arab world. Mandated to investigate human rights violations committed since 1955, it received more than 62,000 complaints and referred 205 cases to specialized chambers, enabling prosecutions against former security officials, ministers, and businessmen connected to previous regimes.

To convict the woman who led that institution is, in the eyes of her defenders, to retroactively criminalize the very work of memory and reparation she embodied. The stakes of this case extend well beyond the fate of a seventy-five-year-old activist who has survived the prisons of Bourguiba, Ben Ali, and now faces sentencing under Saïed. What is ultimately on trial is the durability of a legal and moral legacy that post-revolutionary Tunisia built with great difficulty — and that the present authorities appear intent on dismantling.

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The Charges

According to a well-informed source, the charges brought against the four defendants include “exploitation of public office to obtain an unjustified benefit for oneself or others, causing harm to public administration, violation of applicable regulations, as well as fraud and use of fraudulent documents.” The charges fall squarely within the scope of criminal law governing corruption in the management of public assets.

The case originates from a complaint filed in December 2022 by an association dedicated to the protection of the archaeological and cultural heritage of Carthage. The association alleged the existence of corruption in the transfer of a land parcel in the Carthage area to a private individual at a price bearing no relation to the property’s real value, and without prior consultation with state property appraisers. Experts subsequently appointed by the court confirmed a significant gap between the price recorded in the sale deed and the actual market value of the property at the time of the transaction — a discrepancy that, according to the complaint, caused substantial financial damage to the municipality. A specialized security unit was tasked with enforcing the arrest warrants against the four defendants.

Two Cases, One Journalist

This is not the only legal battle Ziad El Hani is currently fighting. The journalist was previously convicted in a separate case under Article 86 of the Telecommunications Code, which criminalizes harm to others through public communication networks, after publishing an online post that referenced information related to a judicial case. He appealed the one-year prison sentence, and the Tunis Court of Appeal has scheduled a hearing for June 12, 2026.

Two distinct proceedings, two different legal frameworks — one rooted in the management of public property, the other in digital expression — are now running simultaneously against the same individual.

Context: Special Delegations and Article 86

The case against El Hani in the Carthage affair reflects a broader legal grey zone surrounding Tunisia’s special delegations — appointed bodies that replaced elected municipal councils following their dissolution after July 2021. Decisions made by these structures are increasingly being revisited through judicial channels, exposing their former members to retrospective legal liability, regardless of their professional background.

Article 86 of the Telecommunications Code, meanwhile, has been applied in a growing number of cases targeting journalists and online commentators in Tunisia. International press freedom organizations, including Reporters Without Borders (RSF) and the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), have repeatedly criticized the provision for its broad and loosely defined scope, calling for its revision or repeal.

With the June 12 appeals hearing in the first case just days away, and a new arrest warrant now added to the picture, the legal fate of Ziad El Hani remains suspended — pending judicial decisions that are still far from settled.

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A name, a lineage, and an approach based on consensus

Nasser Al-Senussi holds no official position in the current power structures, which remain divided between the UN-recognised government in Tripoli and the parallel authorities in the east. For his advocates, this extra-institutional status is not a handicap but an asset: he would not carry the burden of the armed compromises of recent years. Supporters highlight his network of relationships patiently woven across Libya’s three historical regions, without tribal or partisan exclusivity.

According to several diplomatic sources who requested anonymity, exploratory meetings have recently taken place between foreign envoys and associates of Mr Al-Senussi, although he himself has made no public statement of candidacy. On economic matters, some Libyan observers note that he has been involved in administrative and local development issues, particularly in basic services – electricity shortages, salary blocks, crumbling infrastructure – suggesting he is not a novice facing daily emergencies.

Advocates of this track insist on one point: his trajectory is not that of a militia leader nor an imported technocrat, but of a backstage actor who has consistently called for inclusive round tables. Still, at this stage, his name does not appear on any official UN document, nor on the Presidential Council’s roadmap.

The Libyan labyrinth: between popular expectation and elite deadlock

To understand the media emergence of this figure, one must revisit the mechanics of Libya’s impasse. Since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in 2011, the country has seen two parliaments, three civil wars, and a succession of interim governments. The elections scheduled for December 2021 were suspended sine die, derailed by disagreements over the constitutional basis and the legitimacy of candidates. Today, even the Central Bank remains functionally divided, and oil revenues – the sole national rent – are subject to cyclical blockages.

In this vacuum, civil society and part of the Libyan street express growing fatigue with the shifting alliances of former belligerents. Opinion polls conducted by local institutes, albeit partial, show recurrent demand for a figure neither from the militias nor a direct heir of the old regime. It is in this gap that Al-Senussi’s name acquires meaning, even though his surname ties him to the deposed monarchy – an ambiguity his supporters reframe as a guarantee of national continuity.

The historical backdrop is sensitive: his grandfather, Safi Al-Din Al-Senussi, was a figure of resistance to Italian colonisation and then of the construction of the nascent Libyan state. As an heir to a family that gave two kings to the country, Nasser Al-Senussi walks a fine line: historical capital, but without an asserted monarchist claim. In a country where memories remain vivid, this dual anchoring can both reassure and unsettle, depending on the region.

A test for Libya’s transitional model

The circulation of Nasser Al-Senussi’s name is not yet an exit scenario from the crisis. However, it signals a stubborn reality: none of the governments formed since 2014 has succeeded in organising free and peaceful presidential elections. Foreign sponsors – Turkey, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, the United States – support different actors without being able to impose a lasting compromise. In this chess game, could a consensus figure without an armed apparatus break the logic of force? The hypothesis divides analysts: optimists see it as the only alternative to chaos; sceptics recall that in Benghazi as in Misrata, the real levers of power remain in the hands of local commanders.

Regardless, the public appearance of this name in diplomatic and media conversations is an indicator not to be ignored. With the symbolic milestone of 2026 approaching – fifteen years after the revolution – Libyans are not asking for a saviour, but for a credible window to choose their leaders.

The question that will remain unanswered as long as Mr Al-Senussi has not officially broken his silence is this: in a country where every consensus so far has been devoured by regional rivalries, can a backstage figure with historical legitimacy truly impose an electoral roadmap without in turn being caught up by the war of alliances?

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Visitors came from France, China, Ivory Coast and Italy, including France’s ambassador to Tunisia, a symbolic gesture after two French citizens were among those killed in the 2023 attack. A national guardsman shot and killed five people at the El-Ghriba synagogue soon after the festival that year, spreading fear among the local Jewish population and international pilgrims.

Participants said about 500 people have attended this year’s pilgrimage, held on the Mediterranean island of Djerba from April 30 to May 6 to celebrate the Lag B’Omer Jewish holiday. Jews have lived in Tunisia since Roman times, and the pilgrimage remains central to the country’s small but long-standing Jewish community.

Here is a paragraph on the history of Tunisian Jews:

The Jewish Community of Tunisia: A History Spanning Three Millennia

The Jewish presence in Tunisia is one of the oldest and most continuous in the world, dating back over two thousand years to the era of the Phoenician and Roman empires, long before the Arab conquest of North Africa in the seventh century. According to historical records, Jewish communities settled along the Tunisian coastline following the destruction of the First Temple in Jerusalem in 586 BCE, finding refuge in the fertile lands of what was then known as the Roman province of Africa Proconsularis. Over the centuries, Tunisian Jews developed a rich and distinctive cultural identity, blending Hebrew religious traditions with Berber, Arab, and later Ottoman influences, producing a unique dialect, cuisine, and artistic heritage that set them apart from Jewish communities elsewhere in the Mediterranean world. At their demographic peak in the mid-twentieth century, Tunisian Jews numbered close to one hundred thousand, concentrated primarily in Tunis, Sfax, Sousse, and the island of Djerba — home to the ancient El-Ghriba Synagogue, one of the oldest houses of worship in Africa. The waves of emigration that followed Tunisian independence in 1956, the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967, and the broader regional tensions of the post-colonial era dramatically reduced this population, driving most Tunisian Jews toward Israel, France, and other Western countries. Today, fewer than two thousand Jews remain in Tunisia, yet their cultural and historical imprint on the country endures, visible in architecture, gastronomy, language, and the living memory of communities on both shores of the Mediterranean.

Jewish pilgrimage 2026

Inside the synagogue, the atmosphere was calm and devotional, while also buzzing with conversations and social exchanges. Worshippers lit candles, read sacred texts and wrote wishes on eggs later placed in a sacred cave within the complex, a tradition believed to bring blessings.

Among them was Redj Cahen, a Tunisian-Italian pilgrim who returned after missing last year’s gathering. “We are back, and we are proud to be Tunisian Jews,” he said. “It is a feeling you cannot explain. Only those who come here understand.”

The gathering draws both local worshippers and members of the diaspora returning to their ancestral roots and has long been seen as a symbol of coexistence, attracting Muslim visitors alongside Jewish pilgrims.

A visible but contained security presence surrounded the synagogue, while heavier measures were deployed at access points to the island, where police checkpoints and barricades controlled entry. Vehicles were searched and identification documents carefully inspected. Within Djerba, security was especially concentrated in Hara Seghira and Hara Kebira, the island’s main Jewish quarters.

Despite security worries, the traditional “Minara” procession took place for the first time since the 2023 attack, signaling a cautious easing of restrictions.

The Minara, a pyramid-shaped tower of gold and silver, is placed at the center of the synagogue. Women drape it with colorful scarves in a gesture associated with good fortune, fertility and marriage. A symbolic auction of paintings and Jewish religious items follows as part of a traditional fundraiser for the synagogue’s maintenance, after which the scarf-laden Minara is placed on a cart and paraded outside to the sounds of the traditional darbuka drum, singing and throwing of candy. It is later brought back into the synagogue, concluding one of the event’s pillar traditions.

The pilgrimage, one of the oldest in Africa, has historically drawn thousands from around the world. Attendance dropped sharply after the 2023 shooting outside the synagogue that killed two pilgrims and three security officers. The synagogue was also targeted by a 2002 truck bombing by al-Qaida that killed about 20 people.

“This year’s Ghriba pilgrimage marks a gradual return,” said former Tourism Minister René Trabelsi. “We are returning little by little.”

Trabelsi said Tunisian authorities had pushed to maintain the pilgrimage despite the challenges. The event plays an important role in supporting the local economy.

Khedir Hnaia, who has worked at the synagogue for more than three decades, welcomed the return of longtime visitors. “We would like to reflect a good image to the world, to bring back the glory of Ghriba and make it even better than how it used to be,” he said.

“We need to stand up for our country, we love Tunisia very much and in the same way our country stood up for us we will always stand up for it,” said Haim Haddad, a member of the pilgrimage organizing committee from Zarzis.

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An uncompromising stance on a fractured world

Delegates at the PPDS central council April 2026 session did not shy away from grand geopolitical pronouncements. Their final text starts with a global diagnosis. The party argues that the recurring crises of capitalism are pushing imperialist powers, led by the United States, to multiply conflicts in a desperate attempt to maintain control. They point to the decline of the dollar and the rise of alternative currencies as signs that a new world order is struggling to be born.

The communiqué then moves through a litany of solidarities. It condemns what it calls the “American-Zionist aggression against Iran,” affirming Tehran’s right to defend its sovereignty. It expresses support for Venezuela’s President Maduro, denouncing his “kidnapping,” and stands with Cuba against the US blockade and threats of invasion. The party also accuses France of mobilizing terrorist groups to destabilize the Sahel region, while voicing solidarity with what it sees as revolutionary movements crushed under “fascist” regimes in Turkey and India. On the Arab front, the PPDS is unequivocal: full support for Palestinian resistance in Gaza, rejection of normalization with Israel, and solidarity with Lebanese resistance fighters facing attempts at disarmament.

Tunisia: a long list of grievances against the Saied government

It is on the national level, however, that the PPDS central council April 2026 offers its most detailed and pointed critique. The party insists Tunisia’s current crisis is not circumstantial. They say it is the direct result of economic policies that perpetuate colonial-era dependencies. The communiqué attacks the government’s gradual dismantling of subsidy systems, specifically citing the withdrawal of subsidized products and the promotion of alternatives like “bran bread” – measures they say attack the right to food and burden the poorest.

The council also holds the president and parliament responsible for what it views as attacks on national sovereignty in renewable energy. The ratification of new concessions in Gafsa, Sidi Bouzid, Gabès, and Kairouan is seen as a step towards privatizing the national electricity and gas company, STEG. On freedoms, the PPDS demands the repeal of Decree-Law 54 and the establishment of the long-awaited Constitutional Court. It rejects restrictions on political activity and expresses solidarity with the powerful UGTT trade union federation, which it says is being targeted by “arbitrary measures.” The party also demands the immediate release of Ghassen Henchiri, a member of its political bureau, imprisoned on charges it calls “unfounded.” Finally, the council condemns rising racist speech in Tunisia, holding the “Saïed regime” fully responsible.

A fragmented left searching for a common path

The PPDS central council April 2026 session takes place in a Tunisian political landscape that has been profoundly reshaped since July 25, 2021, when President Saïed seized near-total control. While Saïed successfully sidelined the once-dominant Ennahdha movement and the old guard of Nidaa Tounes, the radical left has not prospered. The PPDS remains an extra-parliamentary force. Its real influence is felt more in grassroots union committees and pro-Palestinian solidarity campaigns than in electoral politics. The collapse of the Popular Front, a previous leftist coalition, has left a void that the PPDS has struggled to fill.

Nouri Beltoumi, the PPDS’s secretary-general, has repeatedly called for unity. But attempts to build a “national progressive front” keep stalling amid ideological differences and personal rivalries. The economic backdrop is grim. Inflation has hovered above 10% for much of the past year. Official unemployment stands near 17%, and shortages of basic goods have sparked localized protests. Migration, another issue the PPDS raised, has become deeply toxic after President Saïed’s past remarks about “hordes” of sub-Saharan migrants and recent street clashes in Sfax. In this context, the PPDS’s message – blending anti-imperialism, social justice, and defense of liberties – resonates with a hard core of activists but has yet to break through to a wider, exhausted population.

A radical voice, an uncertain echo

The Conseil central du PPDS avril 2026 has spoken. Its members leave Tunis with a detailed roadmap for opposition, yet the path ahead remains unclear. The party’s call for a “national progressive front” free from Islamists, Destourians, and the Salvation Front is ambitious. But can this radical diagnosis, powerful in its internal consistency, overcome the deep fragmentation of the Tunisian left and translate into a popular movement? The PPDS is betting that the rising cost of living and the steady squeeze on public freedoms will eventually provide an opening. For now, though, the party remains more of a critical observer than a credible alternative, its voice clear but its echo in the streets of Tunis still uncertain.

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A verdict that lands like a sledgehammer

On Monday, April 6, the sixth criminal chamber of the Tunis Court of First Instance delivered its judgment. One year in prison. The case number — 4135 — will mean nothing to the general public. But in the corridors of Tunisian courthouses, it already resonates as a wake-up call.

The facts for which Hmaidi is being prosecuted date back to 2022, a pivotal year in the recent history of the Tunisian judiciary. That year, President Kaïs Saïed dissolved the Supreme Judicial Council by decree in February, then dismissed 57 judges in June through a simple presidential act. The judiciary was thrown into turmoil. Hmaidi, at the head of the Tunisian Magistrates’ Association (AMT), led the rebellion. He organized, mobilized, spoke out. Too much, in the eyes of some.

Four years later, it is for these very actions that the prosecutor’s office, acting according to the AMT under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice, prosecuted him. The chosen charge — obstruction of labor freedom — is perceived by his defenders as a political recharacterization of a perfectly legitimate trade union commitment.

A judicial journey strewn with obstacles

Even before the verdict, the procedure had fueled controversy. The case traveled through three courts — Monastir, Le Kef, Tunis — through referral decisions that the AMT describes as arbitrary, lacking solid legal foundation. One of these decisions is alleged to have been made by an appellate chamber in the middle of the judicial vacation period, which, according to the association, constitutes a frontal violation of basic fair trial rules.

Hmaidi had invoked his judicial immunity. In vain. The lifting of this immunity, decided by a provisional council of the judiciary whose own legitimacy is contested, was the subject of an appeal for annulment. It went nowhere. At each stage, the defense hit procedural obstacles that the AMT attributes to a deliberate desire by the executive to see this case through to the end, whatever the cost.

“A serious precedent”

In its statement published the day after the judgment, the AMT’s executive bureau does not try to smooth things over. It speaks of an “inequitable decision,” of “facts fabricated from scratch,” of “acknowledged political pressure.” Above all, it points to what it considers a first in the country’s judicial history: never, under any regime, had a magistrate been brought before a court because of his trade union activity.

This claim is worth emphasizing. Tunisia endured decades of authoritarianism under Bourguiba and then Ben Ali. Judges were sidelined, transferred, shelved. But the direct criminalization of a magistrate’s associational engagement would, according to the AMT, constitute a line crossed for the first time.

The association calls on its members to “remain united around their organization” and to continue practicing their profession according to their oath, despite the pressures. It also announces that Anas Hmaidi will appeal the judgment and use all available legal remedies.

Tunisian justice put to the test by concentrated power

To understand what is really at stake behind this conviction, we must return to that turning point of July 25, 2021. On that day, President Kaïs Saïed suspended Parliament, concentrated executive and legislative powers in his hands, and set Tunisia on an unprecedented political trajectory since independence. A new Constitution, adopted in 2022, enshrines this institutional reconfiguration in favor of the executive.

The dissolution of the Supreme Judicial Council a few months later deprived the judiciary of its independent governing body. A provisional council replaced it, lacking the same constitutional legitimacy and the same distance from the executive. The 57 dismissals of June 2022 completed the establishment of a climate of diffuse fear in courtrooms.

It is in this environment that the AMT has continued to function, to publish, to denounce. Today, it is one of the few organized voices that publicly documents what its executive bureau calls “the excesses of the executive in the management of justice outside institutions and far from the law.” Its institutional survival, in this context, is itself an act of resistance.

What this judgment says about Tunisia today

A press conference is scheduled for April 10. The AMT intends to detail there the “serious developments” related to the conviction of its president and explain the context to the public. Judicial appeals will follow their course.

But beyond the procedures, a more fundamental question arises: In a Tunisia where checks and balances have gradually shrunk since 2021, who remains capable of freely speaking the law? Who can still, without risking their freedom, defend the independence of those who are supposed to settle citizens’ disputes?

Anas Hmaidi devoted three decades to raising this question. The Tunis Court of First Instance has just given him its answer. It is not likely the last answer.

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